

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT IN POST-CIVIL CONFLICT SOCIETIES

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ABSTRACT: Under what conditions do post-conflict societies adopt gender-egalitarian norms? Many post-conflict societies experience unprecedented levels of gender-based violence. Not only do women face heightened levels of sexual violence in refugee and IDP camps, as well as increased trafficking for prostitution in the post-conflict environment, but the political and economic instability characterizing post-conflict societies produces a climate of impunity, where legal implementation and law enforcement are particularly ineffective. We argue that the presence of domestic political institutions and women's mobilization mediate the negative influence of the post-conflict environment on violence against women. Specifically, we examine the role that strong legal protections for women and mobilization play in the enforcement of gender-based violence legislation in post-conflict countries. To examine our hypotheses, we utilize an original dataset measuring the strength and enforcement of domestic legal statutes addressing violence against women for the years 2007-2010 in post-conflict countries.

Keywords: Gender-based violence, violence against women, post-conflict, political institutions, women's mobilization

INTRODUCTION

Many post-conflict societies are characterized by heightened levels of violence against women, where “violence against women is empowered and maintained by a culture of impunity” (Asia Justice and Rights, 2015). Consider Tajikistan, a country ravaged by civil war in the 1990s, where at least 50,000 people were killed and 1.2 million became refugees or displaced. During the conflict, women in Tajikistan suffered disproportionately via an increasing societal acceptance of forced marriages and human trafficking, among other forms of violence. From 2001-2004, it is estimated that two-thirds of Tajik women were exposed to domestic violence, 344 women committed suicide, while 433 were murdered by their partners (IRIN, 2004).

Gender-based violence is a defining feature of conflict and, since 2000, the United Nations has passed five resolutions addressing women and girls in conflict and post-conflict societies. Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security calls for the mainstreaming of gender perspectives in all aspects of peace operations and women’s participation in all aspects of post conflict peace-building and governance. The other four resolutions (1820, 1888, 1889, and 1960) address the need to end sexual violence against women in conflict and the inclusion of sexual violence issues in peace processes. Provisions in other conflict-related international law also address violence against women, wherein sexual violence is considered a war crime or crime against humanity under the Geneva War Crimes Convention, an act of torture under the UN Convention Against Torture, and has been linked to the crime of genocide under the Genocide Convention (True, 2012). Perceptions of gender-based violence in conflict have changed as well in the past few decades, particularly as a result of widespread rape in the Balkans and systematic sexual violence as a tactic of war in Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Darfur, among other countries (DeLargy, 2013). While increased international attention to and recognition of the pervasive problem of gender-based violence in conflict

and post-conflict environments represents a significant step toward protecting women from violence, the effort to fully implement UN Resolutions and international law lags and women continue to face widespread violence in these settings.

At the same time, some research shows that conflict may serve as a catalyst for change as women take on non-traditional roles during and following conflict (Hughes, 2009; Berry, 2015). Increased political opportunities for women have the potential to create greater gender egalitarian norms, greater representation of women, and reduce levels of violence against women. Rwanda represents a state in which gender egalitarian norms took hold in society following the 1994 genocide. Women's organizations became active in the aftermath of the conflict and mobilization, coupled with institutional changes and a gender-sensitive leadership, facilitated women gaining greater access to the formal political realm following the genocide (Berry, 2015). The growth in women's representation culminated in 2003, when gender quota legislation was passed, guaranteeing that 30 percent of the Parliament be comprised of women (Newberry and Baldwin, 2000; Powley, 2003). As women's representation increased, women in government, along with women's movements, were able to ensure that policies addressed the needs of women in the post-conflict environment, including the passage of legislation granting women the right to inherit land from deceased family members.

Given the vastly different outcomes for women following the conflicts in Tajikistan and Rwanda, the question becomes: what factors are important for ensuring that more gender egalitarian norms take hold in society (as in the case of Rwanda)? We assert that security for women is facilitated through effective law enforcement and is vital for denying or stopping a climate of impunity for sexual violence in the post-conflict setting. In order for the climate of impunity to subside, law enforcement must be effective: police and security forces must make arrests, conduct investigations, and lawyers and judges must prosecute and sentence perpetrators when gender-based violent crimes are committed. But, what factors ensure that law enforcement agents embrace these egalitarian societal norms and ensure that

law enforcement of gender-based violence is effective? We argue that 1) strong gender-based violence legislation is important for ensuring effective law enforcement and reducing gender-based violence and 2) women's mobilization is necessary to raise the gender-based violence consciousness of the public and to persuade political actors to guarantee enforcement and better outcomes for women in post-conflict states. When either of these conditions are present, the climate of impunity for gender-based violence is less likely to persist in the post-conflict environment.

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN POST CIVIL CONFLICT STATES

Post-conflict states experience significant problems in establishing political, economic, and social stability. Walter (1997) argues that civil wars produce a particularly unstable environment, as warring groups find it difficult to credibly commit to disarmament, resulting in repeated bargaining failures. Indeed, the risk of war recurrence is particularly high in the first decade of post conflict peace; in fact, around half of all civil wars are due to post-conflict relapses within the first decade of peace (Collier et al., 2003). The perpetuation of conflict processes in the post-civil war environment is rooted in the pervasive violence and impunity following conflict. Collier et al (2003) refer to this heightened risk of conflict recurrence as "the conflict trap" and argue that conflict "creates leaders and organizations that have invested in skills and equipment that are only useful for violence" (4).

The post-conflict environment disproportionately affects women. Lingering effects of the conflict result in the perpetuation and even escalation of violence against women post-conflict. Public reintegration of soldiers may result in increased domestic violence, for example, as a result of increased militarization in society and "the celebration of armed masculinity that continues despite the formal laying down of guns and amnesty" (True, 2012: 137).

In addition to the direct negative influence of the post-conflict environment on gender-based violence, indirect effects of conflict place women in positions of vulnerability to violence. While men are more likely to die in combat than women, and women may outnumber men following conflict (Hughes, 2009), the number of female deaths *after* conflict is particularly high, largely due to the lingering social and economic effects of conflict (Li and Wen, 2005). Women often assume the role of the head of household as they are widowed or abandoned following conflict. However, pre-conflict gender norms often make women particularly vulnerable, as women may not have access to rights to inheritance or rights to own property or even travel alone (Jacobson, 2013). Households headed by women face significant poverty and vulnerability to continued violence (Williams, 2012). Women may face discrimination in finding employment following conflict as male combatants are reintegrated into the formal economy. As a result, women are susceptible to informal work, often leaving them vulnerable to violence and trafficking (Chinkin, 2008).

Women also face adverse health effects, including reduction in female life expectancy (Plumper and Nuemayer, 2006) and women and children represent the most common long-term victims of death and disability from various diseases following civil wars (Ghobarah et al., 2003). In the face of failing or destroyed health care systems following conflict, women seek physical, mental, and psychological care and treatment. Physical problems can include injury, infection, unwanted pregnancy, and HIV, while mental effects can include anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorders, depression, and suicide (DeLargy, 2013).

In addition, large numbers of women are also often displaced (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2010). Of the 27.5 million internally displaced persons in the world, 80 percent are women and children (Buscher and Makinson, 2006) and there are another 16.2 million refugees, about half of whom are women (UNHCR, 2009: 3). Women not only face the potential for exploitation and violence in every stage of flight (Amnesty International, 1995), but they also face

abduction, forced prostitution, domestic violence, rape, and sexual abuse among other forms of violence following relocation (Kuoch et al., 1992). As an example, refugee women experience heightened levels of domestic violence as a result of role reversal where refugee women more quickly find jobs than men, largely as a result of the type of jobs available (Cormas and Jansen, 1995). This role reversal profoundly influences families' traditions of patriarchy and hierarchy and challenges the "breadwinner" or "provider" identity of men in the home, which may result in men using violence against women to reaffirm their dominance (Hunt, 1989; Kersten, 1996; True, 2012: 31).

UN-peacekeeping intervention following conflict often generates a "peacekeeping economy," wherein peacekeepers with access to resources generate a demand for sex services and women, often in impoverished situations, become involved in the expanding sex industry, as sex workers and trafficking victims (True, 2012). While peacekeeping operations are temporary, the sex industry tends to remain long after peacekeepers have left, leaving women vulnerable to trafficking and other forms of sexual violence, as well as vulnerable to stigmatization by their communities long after peacekeepers have left (Pallen, 2003; Pugh, 2004; Ní Aoláin et al., 2011).

Given the heightened levels of violence against women rooted in the climate of impunity often characteristic of the post-conflict state, what factors are important for ensuring a post-conflict environment characterized by greater egalitarian norms?

POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: ENSURING SECURITY FOR WOMEN

The political institutional structure of the state often collapses during conflict and as a result, post-conflict states face an environment ripe with impunity which often results in the perpetuation of violence against women, as a result of the legacy of the conflict (Bastick et al., 2007). In post-conflict states, security is vital for ensuring the return of refugees, the establishment of the rule of law, peace-

building, and reconstruction. Security provides the foundation for post-conflict processes. Ensuring physical security in the public realm is often a major priority post-conflict. Evidence abounds of the need to ensure physical security for women in the post-conflict environment. For example, the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children makes various recommendations, including providing "firewood patrols" composed of law enforcement to accompany women traveling outside of refugee camps to collect firewood in Darfur (Patrick, 2006). Further, in the post-conflict state of Liberia, significant attention was placed on the protection and security of women by engaging in extant security sector reform, including encouraging women to join the police force (Cordell, 2010). What factors, then, explain security in the post-conflict environment?

Postwar reconstruction often emphasizes law enforcement and the military, as well as reform in the judicial, legal, and penal systems (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011) Political reconstruction following conflict requires "the establishment and development of legitimate, accountable and capable institutions which ensure a minimum degree of security and protection of all citizens' rights" (Sorenson, 1998: 5). This vision is argued to encompass the "liberal peace" and involves the establishment of democratic institutions, such as multi-party elections, representative legislatures, constitutional reform, separation of powers, and removal of military rule (Duffield, 2008). The inclusion of women in post conflict peacebuilding, including negotiation of peace settlements and post-conflict governance is vital for societies recovering from a legacy of violence against women. As Ní Aoláin et al. (2011: 62) state,

"Centralizing gender within any and all programs designed to enhance post-conflict security not only increases the chances that the programs will succeed in providing security for both men and women, but also provides the best opportunity to recalibrate what it means to be secure, and contributes to the long-term viability of the transitioning society."

[Article 5 in this collection also argues that this type of gender balancing in the conflict and post-conflict countries is important for the promotion of gender equality. More specially, Article 5 highlights that](#)

gender balancing in the security sector “brings together a broader range of experiences, skills, and perspectives to the security sector, which improves to ability to provide security and respond to potential threats” as well as increasing the perceived legitimacy of the security sector in society (7). In a similar vein, we argue that wWomen must be involved in the design of new legal measures to protect them from violence and must advocate for the expansion and enforcement of the rule of law and the provision of justice, as well as the availability of other government services because women draw upon shared experiences and communicate their needs more effectively (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011). In other words, ensuring security and law enforcement in the post-conflict environment is vital if gender egalitarian norms are to take hold, and women’s involvement, both formally and informally, is important to ensure such security.

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE LEGISLATION AND ENFORCEMENT

Legal Reform in Post-Conflict Countries

Legal reform and the adoption of policies protecting women from violence are essential for ensuring women’s security needs and law enforcement in the post-conflict environment. Legislation protecting women from violence must hold perpetrators to account, prevent impunity for conflict-related violence, and provide for adequate sanction. Strong domestic legal standards are important for ensuring the increased “provision of formal justice mechanisms, the monitoring of informal justice mechanisms, and the availability of health, education, and other government services” (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011: 78). While there is significant debate over whether law is an effective barrier to human rights abuse, Keith et al., (2009) find evidence that pursuing rights protection through constitutional guarantees has the potential to improve respect for human rights.¹ Further, in the long-term, strong legal reforms following conflict can have a persuasive and communicative effect in changing people’s

attitudes and perceptions (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011). That is, the adoption of gender-based violence legal guarantees is an indicator of the societal acceptance of more gender egalitarian norms and the recognition of violence against women as a public rather than private problem. Of course there is often a disconnect a difference between law and practice and states may adopt new policies in order to express their commitment to ending violence against women and gaining legitimacy internationally (Meyer and Rowman, 1977). The failure of law to have an influence on actual practice, or decoupling, indicates that we might not expect to see legal protections influence the law enforcement. Article 4 in this collection highlights this gap between law and practice, arguing that laws establishing gender equality have improved over time, while attitudes and behavior have often failed to follow suit. That is, given that the adoption of discriminatory laws against women is largely viewed as inappropriate by the international community, states are likely to adopt laws protecting women, but the lived experiences of women often remain poor. However, we argue that there is significant variation in the strength of laws. The adoption of laws that are stronger and more comprehensive in scope signal greater societal recognition of gender egalitarian norms, and as a result, are more likely to ensure the necessary resources for training, investigation, and prosecution, which is an important step for ensuring better law enforcement and outcomes for women. We argue that when stronger laws are in place, we are less likely to observe substantial decoupling (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005). In earlier work, we find that the strength of gender-based violence legal protections are positively associated with better outcomes for women, including increased human development, and greater gender equality (Richards and Haglund, 2015). However, given the environment of impunity and heightened levels of violence against women in the post-conflict environment, would we expect to observe strong gender-based violence legislation in post-conflict societies?

The Post Conflict Environment as an Opportunity for Women?

Scholars hold conflicting views regarding the role of conflict in empowering women and generating political openings for greater representation and legal reform. Jacobson (2013: 235) states, “We find that political transformations in the postwar context have the potential to be transformative for women, but that this ‘transformation’ cannot be assumed to be uniformly positive.” On the one hand, some scholars find that conflict and crises create opportunities for women to gain access to the political process and increasingly participate politically (Putnam, 1976). [Article 5 takes this approach, arguing that the post-conflict environment can create unique opportunities for security sector gender policy reform, including the introduction of gender quotas in the security sector, because in this environment, the security sector takes on a new public role. The political upheaval following conflict creates new opportunities for reform. For example, w](#)omen often take on new roles and identities during conflict, as female combatants or as politically active participants in social movements and women’s organizations (Bop, 2001; Hughes, 2009). [Data analyzed in Article 2 in this collection shows that women frequently participate in armed groups, and nearly half of all armed groups include female participants and around a third include female combatants \(3\).](#) Following conflict, women may prefer to maintain their new identities and remain politically active. Further, men are relatively more likely to die in combat and more likely to be imprisoned, resulting in higher numbers of women than men in many post-conflict societies (Hughes, 2009; Berry, 2015). As a result of outnumbering men, women may be able to better compete for political positions. In addition, conflict can create political space for women as room is made for new candidates during reconstruction and women may represent candidates far removed from the previous regime (Hughes, 2009).

Political reconstruction and the adoption of domestic institutions following conflict can influence the likelihood of women gaining greater representation within government. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems have been found to be positively associated with female representation in parliament, particularly when voters vote for party lists. (Norris, 1997; Paxton, 1997;

Paxton and Kunovich, 2003). In addition, affirmative action strategies, including national or party-level gender quotas are found to be associated with increased women's representation (Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2007) and have been shown to bring more women into positions of power. While the use of quotas in the post-conflict environment may be tokenistic or symbolic, in the long term, women's gains in power via quotas, "can help begin to address the need to transform the cultures of masculinity that pervade and define political life in many jurisdictions" (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011: 240).

Rwanda represents one of the most commonly cited examples of women making political gains following conflict (and genocide). Women's political representation rose to 56 percent in 2002, the highest proportion in the world (Devlin and Elgie, 2008). Rwanda adopted a party-list proportional representation system and a 30 percent gender quota. In addition the government established a "gender machinery including women's councils, the Ministry for Gender and Women in Development, and gender posts in all other government and ministerial bodies" (Hughes, 2009: 191). As a result of greater representation, women also gained rights to land and inheritance, and have taken on traditionally male occupations as landowners and entrepreneurs in Rwanda (True, 2012: 149).

On the other hand, women do not always make political gains following conflict. That is, although women may represent important actors in early stages of the conflict and during the conflict, their new roles do not always translate into political representation in the post-conflict environment (Geisler, 1995; Waylen, 1994). ~~One reason is that~~That is, conflicts vary in the extent to which they promote gender equality (Moghadam, 1997: 143) and women are often not given access to post-conflict peace processes, removing them from decision-making positions following conflict (Bloomfield et al., 2003). One reason women may fail to make political gains during conflict is highlighted in Article 4 in this collection. The authors argue that the expectation or threat of future conflict may cause the state to prioritize centralized decision-making, defense spending, and restricted rights for citizens, at the expense of policies designed to enhance women's welfare (4).

The empirical evidence is mixed, and largely conditional on various factors. Hughes (2009) finds that conflicts are more likely to create political openings for women when large-scale war is waged, wars are waged to contest the government rather than territory, and international organizations working to educate and empower women develop a presence within post-conflict countries. Despite conflicting arguments regarding the role of conflict in generating political openings for women, we argue that the inclusion of women in the political and legal realm is crucial for ensuring the adoption of strong, comprehensive legislation protecting women from violence, and consequently, gender-based violence law enforcement. That is, absent the inclusion of women in post-conflict political processes, the state risks the environment characterized in Article 4 in this collection, where priority is placed on responding to external (or internal) threats, and not on establishing democratic institutions and ensuring sustained peace.

Women's Post-Conflict Representation and Gender-Based Violence Legal Reform

As women gain political influence, the likelihood of observing legal reform and security for women in post-conflict societies grows. Various studies find that female legislators are more likely than male legislators to introduce bills that address issues related to women's rights (Norris, 1996; Vega and Firestone, 1995; Thomas, 1991). Women in government may represent the interests of women simply by their presence in office (descriptive representation) (Pitkin, 1967) or as a result of the shared interests of women as a group leading them to prioritize different values, attitudes, and policy priorities (substantive representation) (Lovenduski and Norris, 2003; 87). In the post-conflict environment, then, women may better understand policy solutions related to gender-based violence largely shaped by shared experiences with gender-based violence during conflict. This is particularly important because as Article 3 in this collection points out, "roughly 52 percent of civil conflicts between 1989 and 2009 featured combatants engaging in sexual violence against noncombatants" (1). As a result, large numbers of women often bring shared experiences with sexual violence to the table in the post-civil-conflict

environment. Even when women enter into the public realm during or following conflict for reasons other than gender, shared experiences can give rise to a collective consciousness related to feminist issues (Shayne, 2004). As a result, there may be a common interest in ensuring that policies in the new regime reflect the need to protect women from violence following conflict.

Some argue that women's representation does not increase the likelihood of legislation and policies that improve the lives of women. Women's complex intersectionality may produce societies in which women do not use their position to improve conditions for other women. However, other studies find evidence that when women exercise their political rights as voters and representatives, these is "a substantial impact on policy outcomes and the public provision of goods, in particular health and education" (Doepke et al., 2012: 350). Also, because of the heightened levels of gender-based violence during and following conflict, a relatively larger proportion of women have experienced gender-based violence than may be the case during peacetime, and as a result of their shared experiences, women may be more likely to seek policy change associated with violence against women. For example, following the twelve-year civil war in El Salvador, a coalition of left- and right-wing women members of Congress united around the issue of violence against women and successfully passed legislation related to intra-familial violence and the Family Code (Blumberg, 2001). Placing women in positions of power following conflict provides an opportunity to ensure the adoption of policies and security for women in the post-conflict environment that may not exist otherwise. In earlier work, Richards and Haglund (2015) find that increases in the proportion of women in the lower house of parliament are positively associated with strong legal protections from gender-based violence. Women in post-conflict societies may have increased opportunities to participate politically and undertake gender-based violence legal reform, which is likely to positively influence law enforcement. As a result, we posit:

Legal Protections Hypothesis: Post conflict societies with stronger gender-based violence legal protections are associated with greater gender-based violence law enforcement and outcomes.

WOMEN'S MOBILIZATION AND ENFORCEMENT

In addition to opportunities to gain access to the formal political process, women may also have greater opportunities to participate in politics informally, through participation in women's movements. During conflict, women may become active in the public realm through social movements, protest, or by forming or joining women's rights organizations. Following conflict, women may remain active in civil society or even pursue formal political representation (Hughes, 2009).

Women's movements are important at various stages in post-conflict reconstruction. Women's movements were active in rebuilding following the genocide in Rwanda, including drafting reports describing the importance of women in reconciliation, ensuring women's representation in the constitution, and lobbying for the adoption of the constitution, among other activities (Newbury and Baldwin, 2000; Powley, 2003). In addition, women's rights organizations (WROs) were important for ensuring legal reform and law enforcement following the 12-year civil conflict in Mozambique. An all-female military unit grew into the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM) and helped organize civilian women as the first women's organization in Mozambique (Disney, 2006; Hughes, 2009).² Women's mobilization is important in placing pressure on the state to make reforms, such as better women's representation, which influences the adoption of relatively strong gender-based violence legislation and the provision of adequate resources to ensure better law enforcement of gender-based violence legal protections, including training programs for police officers and judges, shelters for victims of gender-based violence, awareness-raising campaigns, among other programs are in place. Women

often organize to change preferences and perceptions regarding violence against women locally and push for greater accountability and an end to impunity in post-conflict societies.

Htun and Weldon (2012) highlight three reasons that autonomous women's movements are crucial for raising awareness of gender-based violence and placing it on the policy agenda. First, when women organize, they generate social knowledge and awareness about their priorities and the issue of violence becomes apparent. This is particularly likely in the post-conflict environment where women's shared experiences with violence are widespread throughout society. Second, because the issue of gender-based violence challenges, rather than reinforces, established gender roles in most places, women are more likely to gain a voice and push for social change through formal political processes when there is substantial political support from broader mobilization efforts. Women's mobilization is important in ensuring that women's interests are heard in the post-conflict reconstruction process and can "provide a power base for women's voices to emerge and influence policy" (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011: 244). Finally, when women organize within autonomous women's movements, they can avoid the need to place their priorities within well-established political institutions, such as political parties, where women's issues may be sidelined. Autonomous organization can focus on and mobilize around women's needs in the post-conflict environment, including the continued pervasiveness of gender-based violence (Htun and Weldon, 2012).

While the evidence shows that an autonomous women's movement is important in ensuring improved gender-based violence outcomes, the mere presence of women's rights organizations (WROs) is unlikely to represent an autonomous women's movement. First, WROs have to exert significant pressure on the state in order to see changes in women's rights (Osirim, 2001; Avedeveya, 2007, Murdie and Peksen, 2015). Avedeveya (2007) argues that in order to influence policy, WROs have to exert enough direct pressure on the state to threaten the states' legitimacy, as was the case in Croatia and Slovenia, for example, where the government responded to large networks of NGOs on the issue of

violence against women by engaging in public awareness campaigns, developing programs on police training, among other actions.

Further, WRO presence may have unintended consequences on gender-based violence law enforcement and outcomes in the post-conflict environment. Scholars caution against “NGO-ization” (Lang, 1997; Alvarez, 1999), in which feminist NGO’s ability to promote change is undermined by various factors, including contractual ties to the state, which threatens NGO autonomy. Also, while WROs pursue normative goals, they are also strategic actors and funding is a concern for these organizations (Murdie and Bhasin, 2011; Hill et al., 2013). When WROs become dependent on funding, they lose their autonomy and may direct substantial resources to gaining funding at the expense of ties with the community and social movements (Montoya, 2013: 10). WROs also change their strategies in order to secure funding. Murdie and Bhasin (2011: 169) argue that “self-interested HROs, looking to maintain a stable flow of resources, are constrained by the concerns of large Western donors, and, by extension, their [Western donors’] preferences...” In the post-conflict environment, states characterized by vast impunity coupled with gender inequality and large-scale violence against women may better attract the attention of the media and Western donors. As a result, WRO funding (and activity) may be concentrated on particularly difficult post-conflict environments. Montoya’s (2013) research also finds that many NGOs that are actively involved in combating violence against women rely on donors other than the state and dedicate substantial resources to soliciting donations and writing grants.³

Finally, the role of *international* and *domestic* WRO activity may be different in securing gender-based violence law enforcement. Shaming by human rights organizations (HROs) alone is not a sufficient condition for improved human rights practices (Risse and Ropp, 1999; Hafner-Burton, 2008; Franklin, 2008). Important to the socialization of human rights norms is the role of *domestic* HROs and domestic mobilization. Murdie and Davis (2012) find that HRO shaming does not have an unconditional influence on human rights practices, but in conjunction with domestic mobilization “from below” (HRO presence),

the influence on human rights is positive. We argue that domestic mobilization (an autonomous women's movement) is vital to ensure better gender-based violence law enforcement and outcomes in the post-conflict environment. Existing data on the role of WRO presence on women's rights outcomes does not account for the activity of WROs domestically, rather, these data account for whether one citizen was a member of any specific women's INGO in a given year and country-level linkages to women's INGOs (Cole, 2013). Unfortunately, existing data on the shaming activities of women's rights organizations do not represent the *domestic* presence and activities of the women's movement either, but rather international shaming "from above" (Murdie and Peksen, 2015).

Given these arguments, we expect that an autonomous women's movement is important in ensuring law enforcement in the post-conflict environment. However, we are cautious in making claims that WRO *presence* is representative of women's mobilization, as WROs behave strategically. Further, we are cautious in assuming that WRO *shaming* is representative of an autonomous women's movement as it does not capture pressure "from below." As a result, we utilize a proxy indicator of women's mobilization, international treaty commitment, which we discuss in more detail below:

Mobilization Hypothesis: Post-conflict countries with greater women's mobilization are associated with greater gender-based violence law enforcement and outcomes.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Sample

The sample used to test the hypotheses includes all post-civil conflict countries from 2007-2010. We examine all countries that have experienced civil conflict since 1946, as defined by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database.⁴ The UCDP/PRIO database defines conflict as, "a contested compatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" (Gleditsch et al.,

2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015). The temporal constraint of 2007-2010 are imposed by the Richards and Haglund (2015) data on the strength and enforcement of legal protections related to violence against women.

Dependent Variables

Enforcement

The primary dependent variable represents the level of enforcement of gender-violence laws (rape, marital rape, sexual harassment, and domestic violence) (*Enforcement*) (Richards and Haglund, 2015). This is an ordinal measure that take on the values, 0 (rare or no enforcement of the law), 1 (incomplete or weak enforcement), and 2 (enforcement is routine or effective).⁵ These data were coded using information from the annual *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* published by the US State Department. Detailed information on the coding of this variable is available in Richards and Haglund (2015).

Rape Prevalence

In an effort to further examine the hypotheses, we also estimate a model explaining gender-based violence outcomes. We expect gender-based violence law enforcement to be positively associated with gender-based violence outcomes. The dependent variable captures women's physical security, specifically rape and sexual assault. This variable comes from the WomanStats Project Database and represents the prevalence of rape within the cultural context, accounting for the likelihood of rape being reported and the inclusivity of what is legally considered rape. The variable ranges from 0 (rape is virtually nonexistent, modified by strength of taboos against reporting and legal inclusivity) to 4 (rape is the norm, modified based on strength of taboos against reporting and legal inclusivity).⁶

Independent Variables

Gender-Violence Legal Guarantees

In order to examine the Legal Guarantees Hypothesis, we utilize Richards and Haglund's (2015) data on the strength of a country's overall protections against rape, marital rape, domestic violence, and sexual harassment. We employ their additive "total VAW laws" index ranging from 0 (no legal protections against VAW) to 12 (full legal protections for all four of these types of VAW) created by combining their individual measures of these same four types of VAW:⁷

Legal guarantees prohibiting [type of violence against women] are

- 0 Nonexistent/Discriminatory
- 1 Incomplete/Weak
- 2 Correlative
- 3 Fully Provided For

Women's Mobilization

~~We use the number of years a country has been party to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as a proxy indicator of women's mobilization (CEDAW Years). Simmons (2009) argues that while treaty commitment alone has little direct influence on human rights outcomes, it increases the likelihood of domestic mobilization, which in turn, influences outcomes. Indeed, she finds continuing growth in the number of a country's women's rights organizations (WROs), post-ratification/accession. Further, the longer a country has been party to CEDAW, the greater the chance for these treaty norms to diffuse in society, breaking down traditional attitudes that might prevent enforcement of existing laws (e.g., Goodman and Jinks, 2013). As such, we expect that the longer a country has been party to CEDAW, the more likely we are to observe mobilization around gender-egalitarian norms, including gender-based violence legal enforcement.~~

~~Unfortunately, existing data on WROs is insufficient in either substance and/or availability to test our mobilization hypothesis. Cole (2013) has collected data on women's INGO linkages to each country, however, in addition to this variable not capturing *domestic* presence of WROs, it is only not~~

available for any of the years in our temporal domain.⁸ Murdie and Peksen (2015) have collected data on WRO shaming activities, however, these data only capture shaming “from above” and, as Murdie and Davis (2012) highlight, shaming is unlikely to be effective absent domestic mobilization. Further, these data are only available for part of the temporal domain of our study.⁹

Control Variables

We include a number of variables as controls for alternate explanations of our dependent variables.¹⁰ First, we expect the passage of time to be positively related to enforcement of gender-based violence legal protections, so we include a variable from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database indicating the number of years since the last civil conflict (*Domestic Peace Years*) (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015).¹¹ Second, we include a variable that captures the intensity of the most recent civil conflict-year (*Civil War Intensity*). This variable is from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database and takes on a values of 1 for civil wars of minor intensity (25-999 battle-related deaths in a given year) and 2 for wars of higher intensity (1,000 battle-related deaths in a year). We expect civil wars of high intensity to face relatively greater post-conflict law enforcement challenges, as impunity is likely to be a major problem. Third, we include a variable that captures the prevalence of sexual violence during the conflict (*Prevalence of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*). We expect that as the level of sexual violence during conflict increases, gender egalitarian norms are less likely to take hold and gender-based violence is likely to endure well into the post-conflict period. This presents increased challenges to law enforcement to investigate, punish, and prosecute offenders in an environment where gender egalitarian norms have not taken hold in society. [Also, Article 3 finds that the adoption of sexual abuse as a strategy of war is a signal of organizational vulnerability and is associated with an increased likelihood of a negotiated settlement. Negotiated settlements have been found to be associated with a higher likelihood of conflict recurrence as a result of instability in the post-conflict environment \(Zartman 1995, Wagner 1994\). As a result, in addition to the persistence of sexual violence from the](#)

[conflict to post-conflict environment, the likely conflict outcome may also produce an unstable environment in which law enforcement faces significant challenges.](#) This variable comes from the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) Database and captures the average cumulative level of prevalence of sexual violence (across all actors) for five years post-conflict (Cohen and Nordås, 2014). Fourth, we include a variable capturing the logged number of refugees in the country (*Refugees*). We expect that as the number of refugees increases, it becomes more difficult for law enforcement to extend its reach throughout the country, given the number of displaced people. These data are taken from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Population Statistics Database.

In addition, we also expect that enforcing laws requires the capacity to hire and train security and judicial personnel, as well as to develop and maintain programmatic responses to the many contexts in which VAW interfaces with the state. We use gross national income per capita as a proxy for a country's level of bureaucratic/administrative capacity (*Capacity*), as well as level of economic development (Hendrix, 2010; 281). Unlike Hendrix (2010), we use GNI instead of GDP, as it includes income from abroad and a country's ability to extract this extra income is a further sign of its bureaucratic/administrative and economic capacities. We also include a variable capturing economic globalization (*Economic Globalization*), as economic globalization can create an environment in which advancements in women's rights become more likely. On the other hand, the benefits of economic globalization are often highly unequal and women may receive few benefits from these policies. As such, we include a variable from the World Development Indicators capturing merchandise trade, the sum of exports and imports divided by the value of GDP, in current US dollars. Also, we include a variable capturing corruption in public office (*Transparency*). We expect law enforcement to be hindered to the extent that there is rampant corruption in public office. We utilize Transparency International's Corruption Perception's Index (CPI), which defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private

gain (TI CPI, 2010). The CPI score comes from surveys of business people, risk analysts, and the general public regarding perceptions of the degree of corruption.

We include fertility rate (*Fertility Rate*) as a proxy measure of traditional attitudes toward women, as some scholars suggest that fertility rates often decline as women become able to control reproductive decisions as larger numbers of women enter into the formal economic sphere (Furuoka, 2009). We also include a binary variable capturing whether a country is unitary (0) or federal (1) (*Federalism*), as a federal state may have more uneven law enforcement due to differences across subnational political units. An indicator of the percentage of women in the lower house of parliament (*Women in Parliament*) is included, as the legislature has access to the “power of the purse” and the provision of resources for law enforcement. We would expect that as the percentage of women in parliament increases, the legislature is increasingly likely to ensure the adequate provision of resources to combat gender-based violence. These data come from the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s Women in National Parliament Statistical Archive (2013).

We also control for the number of years a country has been party to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Simmons (2009) argues that while treaty commitment alone has little direct influence on human rights outcomes, it increases the likelihood of domestic mobilization, which in turn, influences outcomes. The longer a country has been party to CEDAW, the greater the chance for these treaty norms to diffuse in society, breaking down traditional attitudes that might prevent enforcement of existing laws (e.g., Goodman and Jinks, 2013). Article 5 in this collection makes a similar argument regarding CEDAW ratification by highlighting that CEDAW ratification may provide a signal of commitment to gender reforms or greater political will to implement such reforms. As such, we expect that the longer a country has been party to CEDAW, the more likely we are to observe mobilization around gender-egalitarian norms, including gender-based violence legal enforcement.

We control for the presence of an independent judiciary (*Judicial Independence*), or the extent to which the judiciary is independent of other branches of government or the military. Judicial independence has been found to be related to numerous human rights outcomes (see, e.g., Powell and Staton, 2009; Conrad and Ritter, 2013). We expect an independent judiciary to increase the likelihood of legal repercussion for gender-based violence, which should reduce its occurrence. Also, to the extent that women believe that reports of violence against them will result in punishment, they are more likely to report to law enforcement officials. Data on judicial independence is an ordinal variable, ranging 0 (no independence) to 2 (generally independent) taken from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010; Cingranelli et al., 2014). Finally, we also control for a variable capturing substantive and procedural democracy (*Democracy*), as one might expect democratic institutions to encourage representation and accountability for the failure to uphold basic human rights, including violence against women. We utilize the Empowerment Rights Index from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project, which ranges 0 to 14 and includes: foreign movement, domestic movement, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, workers' rights, electoral self-determination, and freedom of religion.

Model Specification

By this time, almost all quantitative human rights studies using ordinal dependent variables -- such as our indicator of enforcement of gender violence laws -- have moved away from using OLS regression in favor of estimation techniques appropriate for this type of dependent variable, both creating better estimates and allowing for appropriate interpretation of results. As a result, we use the ordered logit technique to produce the results in this paper. The ordered logit model is a nonlinear model that allows appropriate estimation in the presence of a categorical dependent variable and provides for a probability-based interpretation of results. A Brant test demonstrates that our model

meets the proportional odds assumption of ordered logit. In a nod towards the pooled nature of our data, we use Huber-White standard errors.

Our basic models are as follows. A “+” preceding a factor listed below indicates an expectation of a positive relationship and a “-” indicates an expectation of a negative relationship with enforcement and rape prevalence. A “+/-” preceding a factor listed below indicates uncertainty as to how that factor will be associated with legal guarantees.

Enforcement = + Total VAW Laws + CEDAW Years + Domestic Peace Years – Civil War Intensity
 - Prevalence of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence – Refugees + Capacity
 (+/-) Economic Globalization + Transparency - Fertility - Federalism
 + Women in Parliament + Judicial Independence + Democracy

Rape Prevalence = + Enforcement + Total VAW Laws + CEDAW Years + Domestic Peace Years – Civil
 War Intensity- Prevalence of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence – Refugees
 + Capacity (+/-) Economic Globalization + Transparency - Fertility - Federalism
 + Women in Parliament + Judicial Independence + Democracy

FINDINGS

<Table 1 Here>

<Figure 1 Here>

Table 2 shows the results from two models. The first, labeled “Enforcement”, is an ordered logit estimation of the level of enforcement of VAW laws in our sample of post-conflict states. Six of the fourteen indicators were found to be statistically-significant associates of enforcement of VAW laws in these states. Figure 1 shows these six indicators’ type, and relative size, of impact on enforcement. It

also shows us that of these six indicators, four were associated with greater enforcement (total VAW laws, judicial independence, transparency, and CEDAW years) and two with lesser enforcement (refugees and democracy). Judicial independence was found to have the greatest absolute impact on enforcement levels. The odds ratio of 3.897 shown in Table 2 indicates that for every increase on the three-point CIRI judicial independence scale, a post-conflict state's odds of greater enforcement is increased four-fold. This finding is in line with those of Powell and Staton (2009) and Conrad and Ritter (2013) that judicial independence is vital to better human rights practices by states.

The second-greatest impact on enforcement is that of transparency (freedom from corruption). The odds ratio of 2.4 from Table 2 tells us that each increase on the transparency measure increases the odds of greater enforcement of VAW laws by 2.4 times. Schuler et al. (2008: 341) note that, in Bangladesh, “weaknesses in formal and informal institutions at the local level that foster patriarchal attitudes and breed corruption discourage abused women from seeking recourse through the shalish or court system and decrease the likelihood of a favorable outcome when they do.” Clearly, enforcement is not going to happen if victims of violence disregard formal enforcement institutions because they feel corruption – financial and/or values-related—is so rife that engaging these institutions is either in vain or, perhaps, dangerous to the victim herself.

Countries with better legal frameworks protecting women against violence have reliably better levels of enforcement, in practice.¹² The odds ratio of 1.876 from Table 2 indicates that for each step a country takes up the 13-point scale of VAW legal protections, the odds of greater enforcement of these laws is increased approximately 1.9 times. This reliable relationship between law and practice in post-conflict countries is encouraging, given the well-acknowledged general gap between *de jure* and *de facto* protections. Also encouraging is the finding that the greater number of years a post-conflict state has been a party to CEDAW, the greater the levels of enforcement of VAW laws in that state. While the odds ratio of 1.14 in Table 2 indicates only a modest gain in enforcement with each additional year a state is a

CEDAW party, one-standard-deviation's worth of party status in CEDAW (six years) is associated with a 2.24 times increase in the odds of high levels of enforcement. That's decidedly less-modest, we think.

One likely reason for the positive association between CEDAW party status and enforcement is the fact that countries with greater numbers of years of CEDAW party status have greater women's mobilization and greater numbers of civil society organizations dedicated to women's issues such as VAW (Simmons, 2009). In turn, these organizations push for better laws and better adherence to existing laws. For example, in post-conflict Liberia:

[W]hen [survivors of gender-based violence] are willing, NGOs guide them through the criminal justice system to reduce their fear of cooperating with the police and going to court. Staffs of some women's NGOs visit police stations to pressure the police to prioritize reported cases and to follow up on those that are pending. NGOs also serve as liaisons between complainants and the police, and their efforts facilitate the investigations. They sometimes provide transportation and phone airtime to enable investigating officers to follow up on cases ... they fill a crucial gap, as the state largely fails to provide these services (Medie, 2013: 390).

As well, acculturation might also provide an explanation for the relationship between a state's length-of-CEDAW-party status and its enforcement of laws upholding core CEDAW principles of nondiscrimination. For example, Goodman and Jinks (2013: 187) claim that "important relationships exist between international-level acculturation and domestic political struggles". We should expect a post-conflict state, through both NGOs and treaty party-status, to be ripe for acculturation with regards to principles of gender nondiscrimination.

We find democracy –here measured as a mix of both procedural and substantive traits – to be reliably associated with lower levels of enforcement. Thirty-two post-conflict states combined a democratic score greater than 10 (our scale ranged 0-14) with a 0 on our enforcement scale, indicating "no enforcement". This group of states is representative of all geographic regions. The one factor

seemingly in common is that this group is dominantly very-small, or micro, states. Only about one-quarter of these states had reasonably good (≥ 10) scores on VAW laws, with the others having scant gender-related legal protections. Clearly, gender-related legal rights are not treated as first-order freedoms in small, post-conflict states and enforcement is typically lackadaisical even where laws and respect for other rights exist. The other possibility for the negative democratic finding is that it is due to low-democracy/high-enforcement states. However, there were only four states in our sample that combined a democracy score lower than 5 with a perfect enforcement score of 2. So, it appears instead that the finding for democracy in Table 2 is likely due to a fair number of very-small states with reasonable respect for democratically-oriented human rights and that manifest no enforcement of VAW laws, even those that have some reasonable amount of formal legal protections against VAW.

<Figure 2 Here>

The second model in Table 2, labeled “Rape Prevalence”, is an ordered logit estimation of rape prevalence in our sample of post-conflict states. The independent variables are identical to the previous model with the exception that enforcement has now entered as an explanatory factor. Five of the fifteen indicators were found to be statistically-significant associates of rape prevalence in our sample of post-conflict states. Of these five indicators, four were associated with lower rape prevalence (judicial independence, democracy, enforcement, and domestic peace years) and only one with higher rape prevalence (civil war intensity). Figure 2 shows two views of these five indicators’ type, and relative size, of impact on enforcement.

The pie graph on the left of Figure 2 shows all five statistically significant indicators together. Clearly, the impact-size of country’s level of conflict intensity prior to peace grossly overshadows that of the other four indicators. Clearly, conflict intensity has something to do with the prevalence of rape, post-conflict, however the massive effect size here is due to the way conflict intensity is measured. This indicator takes on only two possible values, one minor-intensity conflict (25 to 999 deaths) and one

representing major-intensity conflict (1,000 + deaths).¹³ The conflict intensity odds ratio of 93.110 in Table 2 says that states coming out of a major-intensity conflict are 93 times more likely to have high rape prevalence than those coming out of a minor-intensity conflict. Schuld (2013: 60) makes clear the primary process through which this happens: “post-conflict societies sometimes experience levels of violence comparable to those in times of civil war ... Political, conflict-related violence between armed groups, the government and civilians becomes ‘ordinary crime’ after conflict is officially resolved.” What the PRIO conflict intensity measure doesn’t control for is the duration of the conflict producing the death counts underlying the scale score. For example, there should be an important qualitative difference between two cases of conflict where one resulted in 1,000 deaths in a single year, while another resulted in 1,000 deaths over five years. So, we don’t know whether quick-attrition conflict produces a significantly different post-conflict rape-prevalence scenario than does slow-attrition conflict.

The right-hand side of the pie graph breaks out the four indicators reliably associated with lesser rape prevalence in post-conflict states. The number of years a state is beyond its conflict has the largest impact of these four factors on rape prevalence. The odds ratio in Table 2 is .734, but it is probably most intuitive to discuss this (and the other findings in the right-hand pie chart) if we reverse the odds ratio and talk about the factor change in the odds of a post-conflict state being in the *lowest* category of the rape prevalence scale.¹⁴ In this case, we could say that, for each additional year of peace, a post-conflict state’s odds of being in the lowest category of rape prevalence is increased 1.363 times. The standard deviation for peace years is five years, so we could say that for each additional five years of peace, a post-conflict state’s odds of being in the lowest category of rape prevalence is increased 4.712 times.

A post-conflict state’s level of democracy is also reliably associated with rape prevalence. Here, the odds ratio of .557 gives us a reverse odds ratio of 1.796. That is, we find that for each increase in a post-conflict country’s level of democracy on this index, its odds of being in the lowest category of rape

prevalence is increased approximately 1.8 times. A one-standard deviation change on the democracy indicator is 3.039 in our sample, so we can say that change is associated with a state being 5.927 times more likely to be in the lowest category of rape prevalence rather than in the highest category. When combined with the aforementioned peace-years finding, our results strongly corroborate the main conclusion of Beer (2009) that democracy can affect positive outcomes for women of many kinds, but that time is an essential element for this to happen (although, Beer notes, one seemingly ignored by many studies of democracy and gender).

A post-conflict state's level of enforcement of VAW laws, and its level of judicial independence, have very similar relationships with post-conflict rape prevalence, with odds ratios of .234 and .243, respectively. The reverse odds ratios are 4.274 and 4.113, in the same order. A one-category increase in either of these scales is associated with an approximately four-fold increase in the odds of being in the lowest category of rape prevalence. Since a one standard deviation change is also very similar for enforcement and judicial independence (.517 and .604, respectively), we could say for both that such a change is associated with doubling the odds of a state being in the lowest category of rape prevalence.

CONCLUSION

We set out to make an empirical exploration into the enforcement of laws addressing violence against women in post-conflict states. We did so by looking at the associates of enforcement directly, as well as how enforcement is related to rape prevalence in such states. With regards to the direct legacy of conflict on enforcement of VAW laws and rape prevalence in post-conflict states, we come away with two main stories. First, conflict-related elements such as conflict intensity, time since cessation of conflict, and the prevalence of sexual violence during the conflict are not reliably associated with levels

gender-violence laws in post-conflict states. Instead, we find pieces of the post-conflict environment to be more important. Some, such as strength of gender-violence laws, judicial independence, and the number of years a state has been a party to CEDAW, were reliably associated with greater levels of enforcement. Others, such as number of refugees and level of democracy were associated with less enforcement. That transparency in government and an independent judiciary would be associated with greater enforcement of gender-violence laws, or any type of law, really, is unsurprising.

What was surprising was that those post-conflict states with greater democratic features seemed to have less enforcement than their more-autocratic cousins. We can think of two possible explanations. First, perhaps it is the case that democracies make more-egalitarian laws, but authoritarian states are better at enforcing the laws they have; about one-third of the cases in our sample for analysis are authoritarian-dominant states that score an 8 or above on our index of VAW law strength that ranges from 0 to 14. The second possibility is that microstates are influencing this result. We found a large number of very-small states with reasonable respect for democratically-oriented human rights coupled with no enforcement of VAW laws. Richards and Haglund (2015) find that microstates, as a group, have extremely poor laws with regards to violence against women. So, to the extent post-conflict microstates are influencing this finding, enforcement has more to do with attitudes towards women and the presence of gender egalitarian norms in these microstates than does levels of government respect for democratic rights in some general fashion.

The second story about the direct legacy of conflict we come away with is in regards to rape prevalence. Here, we find the past directly having an effect on the present. The intensity of a state's previous conflict and the number of years since cessation of conflict both are reliable associates of a country's level of rape prevalence. As we expected, higher-intensity conflicts are associated with greater rape prevalence while the more years that have passed since a state's last internal conflict, the lower the prevalence of rape in that state. These findings beg us to remember two important things about

post-conflict states. First, violence does not magically stop when a conflict formally ceases. Instead, lingering elements --in some way related to the past conflict—inspire violence to find other forms and outlets. For example, violence can move off the battlefield and into the home. Second, we are reminded that change for the better takes time. No matter what we rely on to improve respect for human rights of any kind in a post-conflict setting, time is required for it to take effect. Time of peace, certainly, is the best time of all for such purposes. Besides those conflict-legacy effects, we also found that greater enforcement of the law and judicial independence are both related to less prevalence of rape. The strength of a country's laws are not found to be associated with rape prevalence, but this is unsurprising, since as Richards and Haglund (2015) demonstrate, almost every country on earth has formally criminalized rape.

We are left with a lot left to know about the enforcement of gender-violence laws in post-conflict states. However, we come away with some findings to guide further research, particularly into what precise institutional features of judicial independence make it effective in addressing violence against women, what particular features of post-conflict democratic institutions -- aside from judicial independence -- are associated with a state's proclivity to enforce gender-violence laws, and why -- when human rights are supposed to be interdependent and indivisible-- does state respect for democratically-oriented human rights not carry over into respect for other human rights such as gender-related human rights.

Table 1. Ordered Logit Estimation of Post-Conflict Enforcement of VAW Laws & Rape Prevalence

	ENFORCEMENT	RAPE PREVALENCE
Total VAW Laws	1.876*** (0.000)	.698 (.168)
Enforcement	----- -----	.234* (.090)
Democracy	.670*** (0.003)	.557*** (.001)
Judicial Independence	3.897* (.091)	.243* (.102)
CEDAW Years	1.140** (0.044)	1.094 (.356)
Fertility Rate	0.703 (0.184)	1.134 (.620)
Federalism	0.955 (0.935)	3.185 (.140)
Capacity	.725 (0.739)	.601 (.724)
Economic Globalization	0.921 (0.955)	9.740 (.617)
Refugees	0.524 ** (0.023)	.840 (.517)
Transparency	2.400** (0.039)	1.447 (.440)
Women in Parliament	0.994 (.884)	1.000 (.996)
Conflict Intensity	1.360 (.739)	93.110*** (.000)
Domestic Peace Years	0.910 (.289)	.734*** (.000)
Prevalence of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence	0.920 (.878)	1.354 (.597)

N:	116	116
Prob > X ² :	.0000	.0000

Figures Reported Are Odds Ratios with p-values in Parentheses

* p≤0.10, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01

Figure 1: Type and Relative Impact of Statistically Significant Factors on Levels of Enforcement of VAW Laws in Post-Conflict States





Figure 2: Type and Relative Impact of Statistically Significant Factors on Rape Prevalence in Post-Conflict States



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Notes

¹ It is important to note that while Keith, Tate, and Poe (2009) look solely at constitutional provisions, in this paper, we examine domestic legal guarantees in legislation, including criminal codes, penal codes, domestic statutes, and case law. Simple constitutional provisions often fail to have an influence on outcomes for women.

~~²Tripp et al. (2009) argue that women's political gains were largely made as a result of the adoption of new electoral and party rules, including a PR system and gender quota, that gave women greater political representation.~~

~~³Existing data do not account for donor preferences and the subsequent strategic behavior of WROs in the advancement of women's rights.~~

⁴ There are 80 countries in the sample that have experienced a civil conflict since 1946.

⁵ A score of 1 represents selective or uneven enforcement.

⁶ This variable is called LRW-SCALE 7 in the WomanStats dataset. The data on rape prevalence was coded in 2011 for the period 2005-2010. WomanStats produces one value for the 2005-2010 time period, so we use the 2005-2010 value for the years 2007-2010 for each country in the sample.

⁷ The creation and sourcing of these data are detailed in Richards and Haglund (2015: 76-82).

~~⁸The Cole (2013) data only exist through 2006.~~

~~⁹The Murdie and Peksen (2015) data extend to 2009, however, given that the temporal domain of our sample is 2007-2010, we would lose one-quarter of the observations in our estimation where N=116 by estimating a model including WRO shaming activities, making convergence difficult.~~

¹⁰ In the online appendix, we include a table with further variable descriptions and descriptive statistics for each variable.

¹¹ This variable ranges 0-62. For the purposes of focusing solely on post-conflict countries, we exclude countries currently experiencing conflict.

¹² We recognize the possibility of endogeneity in the models shown in Table 2 such that women's representation in parliament, democracy, and trade have been shown to be reliably associated with a country's level of VAW laws. To test whether this possibility was affecting our findings from the regular ordinal logit estimation, we estimated simultaneous bivariate ordered probit versions of our models. These returned $p > X^2$ independence-of equation statistics of 0.5431 and 0.2369 for the enforcement and rape prevalence models, respectively. This indicates no threat to inference via endogeneity from using the original ordered logit estimations reported in Table 2.

¹³ It is important to remember when considering the story told by the conflict intensity indicator's odds ratio that a score change on this measure could represent a change from 999 to 1,000 deaths or a change from 25 to 25,000 deaths, for example. This is due to the ordinality of the measurement approach and its accompanying truncation issue (the first category is 974 deaths wide, at most, while the upper category has no upper bound imposed by the measurement scheme).

¹⁴ We do so using the "reverse" option for Long and Freese's (2014) "listcoef" Stata command.